Human organs are being bought and sold for transplant operations all
over the world, and this trend is not necessarily declining. In Japan,
buying and selling organs is not supposed to be happening, but how long
will that last? Transplants of organs between living family members are
becoming relatively more common in Japan; transplants not only of
kidneys but also of liver tissue are also increasing. However, why
should this be all right between family members but not all right
between people with a more distant relationship? In 2006, the media
reported that a doctor in Ehime Prefecture repeatedly transplanted
diseased kidneys removed from patients into more seriously ill
recipients. As the lack of healthy and postmortem donors meant
accepting a diseased kidney was the only alternative to death, the
recipients and their families were deeply grateful to the doctor.
Some people also offer their sperm and eggs for use in medical
treatments, a boon to couples in which the wife has been unable to
become pregnant. Imagine the joy of couples finally able to have a
child! Shouldn't we sanction sperm and egg donation as long as it is
not financially compensated? Perhaps we should even approve of
surrogate mothers who offer to give birth to other people's babies.
This practice is not allowed in Japan, but it is in South Korea. It is
also said that over 2,000 eggs have been offered for use in human
embryo cloning research in that country. Eggs are being donated for in
vitro insemination, but can we say that they should not be used for
research aimed at saving patients with diseases resistant to existing
cures? Drug-induced ovulation is a serious matter for both the body and
mind of the donor--in some cases it can even lead to death. However,
isn't the procedure safe for women who react with insignificant side
effects?
How should we answer these and the many other questions posed by the
progress of new medical technologies from the standpoint of Buddhist
ethics? The first thing that comes to mind is the concept of jihi, Buddhist compassion. The Japanese word is composed of two kanji characters, ji, meaning "benevolence," and hi,
meaning "compassion." Buddhist compassion consists in giving comfort to
others and relieving their suffering. Looking at the Jataka tales,
which describe the previous lives of the Buddha, we find stories of how
he voluntarily sacrifices his own life to try to save the lives of
others. The story of the prince who offered his own body as a meal to
starving tigers is one of the more well-known tales. From the point of
view of those who escape death by receiving donated organs or obtain a
child by receiving donated gametes or making use of the services of a
surrogate mother, these medical technologies are an occasion for
rejoicing. Doesn't this mean that buying and selling organs and
surrogate motherhood are allowable and in line with the teaching of
Buddhist compassion?
Looking at actual, individual cases, we might be led to believe that
this is indeed an appropriate argument. However, the matter is not
quite so simple. To actually "voluntarily sacrifice one's body," as the
Buddha does in the Jataka tales--this is not something just anyone can
do without extreme difficulty. It is only really possible for those who
are so exceedingly pure and good that, like the Buddha, they fall into
a category of unique beings. There are very few people who, on honest
reflection, would say that they are capable of doing such a thing.
Thus, if we advocate such sacrifices as manifestations of Buddhist
compassion, we are in fact asking of others something we cannot do
ourselves. We tend to think of Buddhist compassion as an unlimited
good, but in reality, serious harm or loss may come to the person
trying to put it into practice. Are we really taking this not
inconsiderable possibility into account when we advocate acts of
Buddhist compassion by others?
One reason we tend to use of the concept of Buddhist compassion somewhat lightly may be because the word jihi
was originally used largely in the context of an asymmetrical
relationship. This kind of compassion is primarily taken to be an
attribute of the Buddha, with human beings understood as recipients of
the Buddha's compassion. There are limitations to the conscious
practice of Buddhist compassion by human beings. People who think of
themselves as voluntarily practicing Buddhist compassion are relatively
few, and so self-awareness of these limitations is also bound to be
rare. In considering problems of bioethics, we need to re-evaluate what
we mean when we speak of Buddhist compassion in the context of
interpersonal action. When a person attempts to put it into practice,
there is a significant possibility that that person will suffer loss or
damage of some kind. Thus, what additional factors do we need to
consider when we ask for something that requires an act of Buddhist
compassion by another?
One factor is how to apply the Buddhist precept against killing. In
the field of bioethics studies in the United States, four principles
are normally given as criteria for defining bioethical acts: autonomy,
non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. Beneficence and
non-maleficence appear to overlap, but beneficence addresses the
potential for goodness and happiness, while non-maleficence evokes
averting the threat of the possibilities for evil and violence. Where
Buddhist compassion relates more deeply to the principle of
beneficence, the Buddhist precept against killing relates to the
principle of non-maleficence. This precept says we should not kill or
harm any living thing, but in a more modern interpretation we can take
it to mean that, in any event, we should refrain from violence against
other people.
We need to think about whether or not we should sanction the buying
and selling of organs, human egg donation, and surrogate motherhood in
the light of this modern interpretation of the Buddhist precept against
killing. In most cases, people offering their organs for sale are poor
people who need money for daily life in the present, even if this means
shortening their future life span. Little research has been done on
whether donors selling organs are more likely to fall ill afterward or
how much the procedure might be shortening their lives. However, it
would probably be overly optimistic to assume that donating a kidney
shortens the donor's life span in only a small minority of cases, and
the same most likely goes for egg donation and surrogate motherhood.
We also need to make educated guesses about what might happen if
these procedures come to be perceived as a good thing as they spread
around the world, and become part of normal behavior in human society.
If donating human eggs were socially sanctioned, even though
regulations might allow only voluntary donation, in fact many women
would probably find themselves in a position where they have no choice
but to donate their eggs. The same can be said for selling organs and
surrogate motherhood. Research already shows that, even in the case of
parts of organs being donated by the patient's living family members,
many people find themselves forced into a position where they have no
choice but to become a donor. If this is a true reflection of reality,
it comes close to coercing people in a position of weakness to
sacrifice their own health in the service of others. This violates the
principle of non-maleficence, and goes against the modern
interpretation of the Buddhist precept against killing.
Another factor we need to take into account in addition to Buddhist
compassion is the concept of bodhisattva practice as taught in Mahayana
Buddhism. Bodhisattva practice is altruistic action, and might be
defined as Buddhist compassion put into practice, but a stronger sense
of mutual equality between giver and receiver is implied in the case of
bodhisattva practice. The Lotus Sutra is well known as the sutra in
which bodhisattva practice is most forcefully expressed; in its
twentieth chapter, "Bodhisattva Never Despise," there appears a
bodhisattva who worships the buddha-nature in every person he
encounters. This behavior causes some people to become suspicious and
in some cases to treat him with malice or violence, but this does
nothing to deter Bodhisattva Never Despise from worshipping them. The
concept of bodhisattva practice is understood as a relationship of
mutuality in which one person can put himself in the place of another
and vice versa. It encourages people to have a feeling for the
weightiness of another's existence, and to be open and welcoming toward
others even in the full realization that mutually interacting with
others will inevitably involve each hurting the other somewhere along
the line.
What I would like to emphasize is that the concept of bodhisattva
practice includes the notion of equality and mutuality between those
who interact with one another. Referring to the concept of bodhisattva
practice should provide us with an approach we can adopt in our
examination of bioethics that includes a sense of mutuality and
equality that the concept of Buddhist compassion was less apt to evoke.
Buying and selling organs, donating human eggs, and surrogate
motherhood all tend to give rise to relationships that place one person
in one type of position and that place the other person in a different
and subordinate position. Such a relationship is extremely likely to
create a situation in which one person uses his or her own body as a
tool for the benefit of another. In the final analysis, this means
using that person's body as chattel or as a commodity. To use a
person's body as a tool or resource is to treat the human body with
contempt, and this is very likely to lead to mutual psychological
injury and callousness. This goes against the Buddhist precept against
killing in its modern interpretation, that is, the ethical criterion of
restraining violence.
Susumu Shimazono is a professor in the Graduate
School of Humanities and Sociology at the University of Tokyo. His
special fields are the comparative study of religious movements and the
history of religion in modern Japan. He is the author of numerous books
on religion, spirituality, and bioethics, and has served on the
Japanese prime minister's panel on bioethics.
This article was originally published in the October-December 2007 issue of Dharma World.