Dharma World Buddhist magazine

Contemporary Religion and Social Crisis in Japan

by Robert Kisala

The emergence of new religious movements in Japan can at least in part be attributed to the great social change, even social crisis, associated with the process of modernization.

In addressing the issue of contemporary religion and social crisis in Japan, I would first like to give my own personal view of how new religious movements have been especially associated with social crisis in Japan, and then address what I see as some of the "crises" that need to be addressed in contemporary society. As a foreigner "looking in," and participating in, Japanese society, the view I present might seem somewhat strange, and, indeed, it might be off the mark, but perhaps it will nevertheless offer some new insights that might be of some value.

The emergence of new religious movements can at least in part be attributed to the great social change, even social crisis, associated with the process of modernization. This is perhaps particularly true in Japan, where a relatively large number of these new movements has emerged in the last two centuries. Although there are several different ways to classify these movements according to the period of their emergence or growth, I like to describe them as comprising three waves of movements, according to the religious tradition that they predominately draw upon, and the unique "crises" that accompanied the various periods of Japan's modernization. For example, some of the new religions trace their roots to the end of the early modern period in the first half of the nineteenth century through the first half of the Meiji era (1868-1912). Groups from this period are often based on folk religious practices and the experiences of a charismatic founder, and they can be described as attempts to revitalize traditional cultural elements in the face of the influx of Western influences during that century. Another wave of new religious movements emerged in the immediate postwar period, attracting much media attention in Japan as well as abroad. These movements were often Buddhist-based lay movements, and some of them have been successful in attracting followers numbering in the millions. Part of the reason for their success lies in the fact that they offered the increasingly urban population a means to perform the traditional ancestor rites in the home, independent of the Buddhist clergy and temples that they left behind in the move to the cities, while also offering an alternative means to form relatively strong community bonds in the often cold and anonymous urban environment. Finally, a third wave of new religions has emerged since the 1970s, mirroring religious developments predominantly seen in the West. These movements emphasize personal spiritual development, and encourage the adoption of ideas and practices from a wide range of religions in order to contribute to that development--these are individualistic types of religion that seem to respond to the crisis of trust in social institutions that characterizes this period.

The continued emergence of these movements makes it difficult to maintain that Japan is a secular society. However, many Japanese would prefer to see themselves as secular or unconcerned with religion. In a recent survey, for example, only 26 percent of the respondents in Japan described themselves as religious. In part this is due to the controversy surrounding some religious groups, particularly these new religions that I have identified with Japan's modernization. The already poor image of these groups was further damaged by the terrorist activities of Aum Shinrikyo in the mid-1990s, contributing to the rise of an anticult movement in Japan. However, the attitude toward religion in Japan is also a function of fundamental differences in the understanding of "religion" as compared to the West, differences that arise from the history of religion in Japan, a point I will come back to in talking about contemporary problems at the end of this essay.

Modernity and the emergence of these new religious movements in Japan is closely associated with the country's contact with the West. What is commonly referred to as the early modern period followed the arrival of Portuguese and Spanish explorers in the sixteenth century, and was marked by the attempt to limit contact with the West during the two-and-a-half centuries of Tokugawa rule (1603-1868). The modern period was ushered in by the collapse of the Tokugawa regime in the face of the forced opening of the country by American and other Western powers, leading to a mad rush to catch up with the West economically, technologically, and militarily. The desire to build a nation strong enough to avoid Western colonization contributed greatly to the emergence of Japanese nationalism and Japanese colonialism, and impacted on religious developments during this period. Government attempts to separate Buddhism from Shinto and to establish Shinto as the moral and spiritual basis for Japanese nationalism provided the background against which religion as a concept was debated and understood. In addition, the effects of industrialization, urbanization, and the affluence of the postwar period are especially apparent in the emergence of new religious movements, where the changing face of Japanese society is reflected in the development of the first rural movements that emphasized an egalitarian solidarity, then urban mass movements, and finally a turn to the self in post-1970 movements.

The government attempt to separate Buddhism from Shinto and identify Shinto with the Japanese national identity--in effect an effort to create a national religious ideology as a vehicle to promote cultural identity--could only be maintained by the use of increasingly oppressive force, and ultimately failed when that force could not be sustained following the defeat of the nation in 1945. Other religious movements that emerged at the same time that State Shinto was being created ultimately proved to be more effective and long-lasting means to preserve cultural identity in the face of the massive importation of foreign cultural items. These movements can be identified as the first of three major waves of new religious movements that largely define the contemporary Japanese religious scene.

Tenrikyo, Konkokyo, Oomotokyo, and other new religions that emerged at this time in Japanese history served two social functions. Their emphasis on solidarity within an essentially rural society--through the preaching of a universal equality, mutual help activities (such as hinokishin in Tenrikyo), and emphasis on individual moral reform--helped to cushion the impact on the agricultural sector of the economic changes that had already begun to occur in the latter part of the early modern period. Secondly, they helped to preserve a sense of cultural identity in a rapidly changing society, as seen for example in Tenrikyo's belief that the center of the universe lies precisely in the cradle of Japanese civilization. Indeed, many of the new religions emerging at this time were located in the area around Nara and Kyoto, the ancient capitals of the country. This sense of cultural identity was sometimes exaggerated to something approaching xenophobia. This is perhaps most pronounced in Oomotokyo, where the founder, Nao Deguchi, is said to have proclaimed in a trance that, "Japan is the way of the gods, but foreign countries are the lands of the wild beasts, ruled by devils, where only the strong survive."

While it is difficult to give an accurate count, there are at least several hundred new religious movements active in Japan. The vast majority are small, local groups; national, or international, movements like Tenrikyo, which has over one million believers, are relatively few. Nearly all of the mass movements, such as Soka Gakkai, with perhaps 9 million members, or Rissho Kosei-kai with over 6 million, are postwar, urban forms of Buddhism, and they comprise the second wave of new religious movements in Japan.

Like its predecessor Reiyukai, Rissho Kosei-kai offers its believers a means to venerate the ancestors in the home, without the assistance of a Buddhist priest--an important religious development in reaction to the urbanization of Japanese society. Early in the twentieth century more than 80 percent of the Japanese population was engaged in agriculture. By 1935 the urban population stood at 30 percent, a figure that rose to 50 percent by the end of World War II. By 1977, however, more than 80 percent of the population lived in cities, reversing the situation of only sixty years before. For many people this meant that their ties with the local Buddhist temple were completely severed by the move to the city. Interestingly enough, the observation can be made that Japanese urbanization has led to a considerable religious revival. Whereas in the past the main tie to the local Buddhist temple centered on annual memorial rites, for which a Buddhist monk was summoned and paid, the lay Buddhism that emerged in postwar urban Japan not only encouraged daily practice at home, but also resulted in more active and sustained participation in communal religious functions. A central practice here is the hoza, often described as a combination of group counseling and faith-witnessing carried out by the believers on a weekly or monthly basis.

The postwar new religions serve a function in enhancing social cohesion comparable to that of the first-wave new religious groups. The postwar groups act as a bridge, both religiously and socially, between rural and urban Japanese society, providing an entirely new way to perform the requisite memorial rites for the ancestors, as well as becoming the focus of community for many people in the impersonal urban milieu. Groups from these first two waves of new religions often share a common worldview and ethic, offering an essentially optimistic view of the world and of humanity, and emphasizing values that comprise a common ethic of everyday life--the attempt to live honestly and sincerely, in harmony with one's family, neighbors, and coworkers. The worldview and values offered by the third-wave groups, however, is in many ways a break with these traditional views.

As in much of Europe and North America, in the last twenty years in Japan one can see a new interest in mysticism and the occult that is normally summed up under the term New Age. This new religious ferment is often characterized as eclectic, individualistic, and result-oriented. Through the use of certain techniques, either meditation or body-work, or some combination of the two, it is believed that one can achieve a personal transformation, resulting perhaps in a higher level of consciousness or the attainment of psychic powers. While often one participates in this movement by purchasing books that amount to training manuals at the local bookstore, or at best through a loose association or "network" of fellow practitioners, in Japan a number of organized religious groups incorporating these characteristics have become popular since the 1970s.

Movements from this period are at least in part a result of contemporary cynicism and ennui. In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan achieved a level of economic development that would have been unthinkable a generation before. The "oil shock" in 1973, however, introduced a period of relatively low growth, which made future advancement, both for the individual and society, less certain. This trend was further acerbated by the collapse of the "bubble economy," based largely on stock and land speculation, and the decade-long recession in the 1990s. With economic or social advancement thus stymied, individual spiritual development has perhaps become more attractive. In addition, the failure of the 1960s student protest movement encouraged a turning inward; what could not be achieved through social protest was now sought through personal transformation, the reformation of society one person at a time.

What I see as the major issues for religion in Japan today are interrelated, and center on the issue of the crisis of faith in religion as an institution. I mentioned briefly above some of the difficulties with the term "religion"--how it has historically had a different connotation in Japan than it has in the West, and how historical events have contributed to a widespread distrust in religion. Let me briefly expand on this point first.

In a recent survey, when asked about their confidence in seventeen social institutions, only 13 percent of the respondents in Japan indicated some level of trust in religious groups, putting religious institutions at the bottom of the list. This reflects a high level of distrust toward religious groups across the board. Indeed, in popular discourse, Buddhism is usually identified with the lucrative funeral industry, and its priests are criticized for their married state and meat-eating habits; Shinto suffers for its identification with the militaristic state; and new religions are seen as often dangerous frauds. In such an environment, those affiliated with a religious group often feel that they have to hide their religious beliefs in order to be accepted by friends and society.

However, despite this low level of religious affiliation and considerable distrust of religious organizations, three-fourths of the population profess some kind of belief in a higher power, whether that be described as God, Spirit, or Life-force. A similar number feel that it is important to have a religious funeral service, and 80 to 90 percent participate in annual rites such as the New Year's visit to a temple or shrine or memorial services for the ancestors. We see that religion is a difficult concept in modern Japan, because it is identified with religious organizations and is often divorced from what would normally be identified as religious sentiments and activities--often seen as mere social customs in contemporary Japan.

If religion as an institution is to regain some level of trust, I believe that it must be seen as contributing positively to contemporary society, especially in terms of offering a moral voice to public discourse on current problems--the collapse of the family, ethnic and gender discrimination, individual rights and public ethics, and war and peace, for example. Once again, survey results seem to indicate that people look to religion for some kind of guidance regarding these issues, with less than one-third of the population saying that they are satisfied with religion's response to social problems.

The second problem is related, in that it both arises from the widespread distrust of religion and contributes to furthering this distrust; it is the problem of the privatization of religion, sometimes called "spirituality" to distinguish it from previous religious forms. The distrust in religious institutions has led some to explore on their own how to fill the spiritual needs that religion used to provide, particularly needs for comfort in trial and the challenge to further personal growth. Rather than turning to religious communities, people choose to explore on their own, sometimes drawing on the resources supplied under the name of "New Age" or the "Spiritual World." To the extent that this leads to further human maturity, there is much that can be positively evaluated in this development. However, there are also dangers, for the individual and community. Individually, without proper supervision and instruction, it can lead to a reckless use of religious and spiritual resources that is ultimately psychologically damaging. And with its emphasis on the individual, it increasingly makes family, community, and social life untenable.

The final problem is much broader and more complex, and contributes to distrust of religion in general by enhancing the development of closed, militant religious movements. The problem here is globalization. While, on the one hand, globalization can also be seen positively as contributing to greater awareness and understanding of the other, contributing to a feeling of unity for the whole human race by enhancing participation in global trends and events, it is also often seen rightly as a threat to unique individual and cultural identities. Certainly one contributing factor to the rise of fundamentalist movements is the perceived need to maintain these unique identities in the face of the globalizing, or colonizing, onslaught. The preservation of diversity within an overarching unity is perhaps the most important issue for our day.

Rev. Nikkyo Niwano's example can serve well as a guide in meeting these challenges. Rev. Niwano was well aware of the public and social role, and responsibility, of religious institutions, and sought to address these needs through his own personal pronouncements as well as enhancing a social commitment institutionally within Rissho Kosei-kai through such things as social welfare education. He was aware of the need to emphasize community as a means to individual spiritual growth, working to strengthen the ties among his followers as well as with other religious and social groups. And his interreligious activities, especially his role in founding and fostering the World Conference of Religions for Peace, remains as an example of the preservation of diversity while trying to promote unity. Contemporary religious leaders can still learn much from the example of Rev. Niwano.

Robert Kisala is a professor in the Faculty of Humanities at Nanzan University, Nagoya. He has written extensively on new religious movements in Japan, including Prophets of Peace: Pacifism and Cultural Identity in Japan's New Religions, a study of religious involvement in the peace movement in Japan.

This article was originally published in the April-June 2006 issue of Dharma World.

back to this issue's table of contents